This paper develops an endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, (...) insofar as a semantic analysis of our temporal talk favors it over rivals. It is metaphysically fruitful, insofar as the theory of persistence that can be built around it – the transcendentist theory of persistence, to give it a name – requires neither temporal parts nor the problematic commitments to which all extant forms of endurantism are committed, such as the possibility of extended simples or multilocation. (shrink)

The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location—is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location—in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called ‘functionality’, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a (...) definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for the location of immanent universals, the multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects, the multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and that it makes extended simples impossible. (shrink)

In this paper we will look at research by the philosopher of the mind João Fernandes Teixeira in "Uma nota sobre Sartre e Damásio ou as emoções entre a Fenomenologia e a Neurobiologia". From this we will analyze the theory of emotions of Jean-Paul Sartre in "Sketch for a Theory of Emotions" and of the neurobiologist António Damásio " Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the feeling Brain ". We will briefly discuss the theory of emotions of Jesse Prinz and (...) neuroscientist Robert Lent. Finally, we will propose that the synthesis for the quest to identify the meaning of emotions, as Sartre wanted, should involve combining different causal approaches to emotional phenomena to better understand the. (shrink)

The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism and three- and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection.

The Aristotelian view of universals, according to which each universal generically depends for its existence on its instantiations, has recently come under attack by a series of ground-theoretic arguments. The last such arguments, presented by Raven, promises to offer several significant improvements over its predecessors, such as avoiding commitment to the transitivity of ground and offering new reasons for the metaphysical priority of universals over their instantiations. In this paper, we argue that Raven's argument does not effectively avoid said commitment (...) and that Raven's new reasons fail. Moreover, we present a novel ground-theoretic interpretation of the Aristotelian view, referred to as strong immanence, and introduce a new argument against the Aristotelian view, intended to sidestep any commitment to the transitivity of ground. (shrink)

Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the basic concrete entity on which each of its parts depend. Kovacs has recently argued that none of the classical notions of dependence could be used to spell out priority monism. I argue that four notions of dependence – namely rigid existential dependence, generic existential dependence, explanatory dependence, and generalised explanatory dependence – can indeed be used to spell out priority monism, and specify the conditions under which this is possible.

In this historical article, Newton da Costa discusses Francisco Miró Quesada’s philosophical ideas about logic. He discusses the topics of reason, logic, and action in Miró Quesada’s work, and in the final section he offers his critical view. In particular, he disagrees with Miró Quesada’s stance on the historicity of reason, for whom “reason is essentially absolute”, whereas for da Costa it “is being constructed in the course of history”. Da Costa concludes by emphasizing the importance of (...) Miró Quesada’s theory of logic and reason, despite it still being incomplete. -/- Historical article by Newton da Costa, annotated and translated by J. C. Cifuentes and L. F. Bartolo Alegre. (shrink)

Neste trabalho pretendo mostrar como o confronto com o materialismo reducionista de Thomas Nagel o fez voltar a defender concepções e explicações teleológicas advindas da teoria aristotélica. Nagel defende que deva existir uma ordem natural como tentativa de inteligibilidade que para além da explicação pelo viés da ciência física, deve conter outros elementos, ou seja, suspeita que deva incluir elementos teleológicos. É aqui que pretendo comparar a noção teleológica na argumentação de Nagel e de Aristóteles. Para além disso, incluirei como (...) Aristóteles e Nagel entenderam ideias pampsiquistas e mostrarei que a teoria aristotélica não é pampsiquista, como alguns pensam. (shrink)

Neste artigo apresentaremos o que Donald Davidson entende por ação eracionalidade. Veremos o problema de eventos mentais causarem eventos físicose como o autor defende sua teoria do monismo anômalo. Isso implica explicar adiferença entre o que Davidson entende como um evento físico e um eventomental, e como podemos identificá-los para tentar racionalizar a ação. Aracionalidade engloba modos para tentar explicar mental e físico de formasdescritivas distintas, mas que de algum modo encontram-se na unidade dosujeito agente. Ao mesmo tempo que Davidson (...) reconhece a não identidade totalentre a explicação entre fenômenos físicos e mentais, ainda nomeia certo tipo deanomalia das leis mentais. -/- ABSTRACT -/- In this article, we will describe what the author Donald Davidson understands byaction and rationality. We will see the problem of mental events causing physicalevents and how the author introduces his theory of anomalous monism. Thisimplies explaining the difference between what Davidson understands as aphysical event and a mental event, and how one can identify them to attempt torationalize action. The rationality encompasses ways of explaining both themental and the physical in distinct descriptive ways, but which somehowmeeting in the unity of the subject agent. (shrink)

Este trabajo parte del análisis de Heidegger en “¿Para qué poetas?”, donde el autor interpreta la poesía de Hölderlin a partir de su elegía «Pan y vino», aquí expondremos algunas de sus explicaciones. También intentaremos entender la respuesta que da Hölderlin en la que asocia los poetas a los «sacerdotes del dios del vino». Para ello nos ayudaremos de las nociones que de Dioniso nos ofrecen tanto Nietzsche como Hölderlin, presentaremos semejanzas y diferencias de algunas de sus interpretaciones. Aparte de (...) eso, reflexionaremos sobre la visión del artista como un dios y la relación existente entre la poesía y la filosofía. Concluiremos con las reflexiones que Heidegger hace en su trabajo “Aclaraciones a la poesía de Hölderlin”, donde el autor sobrevalora el papel de la poesía, considerando incluso que los poetas pueden llegar a esclarecer pensamientos de cualquier filosofía pensada a medias. (shrink)

In the debate about Christian attitudes to other religions, a threefold typology has emerged depicting differing Christian responses: pluralism, inclusivism and exclusivism. (This typology is not restricted to the Christian debate alone.) Traditionally, pluralism is opposed to exclusivism, the former claiming that it is arrogant and untenable to make exclusive truth claims, and that all religions are potentially equal paths to salvation and truth. In contrast, I argue that pluralism must always logically be a form of exclusivism and that nothing (...) called pluralism really exists. The main purpose of my paper is to show that there is no high-ground in the pluralist position, for in principle its logic is no different from the exclusivist position. If this is established, then the debate can proceed with more substantial issues regarding the justification and clarification of truth claims. (shrink)

Este trabalho analisará as influências da teoria aristotélica nas origens da fenomenologia, especificamente na investigação de Franz Brentano. Debruçaremos sobre a obra em que Brentano se afirma um aristotélico e compararemos com os seus intentos de destacar a psicologia como ciência juntamente com os fundamentos da fenomenologia. Para tal também desenvolveremos a importante noção de intencionalidade para a fenomenologia. E por fim, mostraremos que Brentano não nos parece tão aristotélico o quanto afirma.

How do objects persist through time? According to endurantism, objects persist through time and do not have temporal parts. According to the transcendentist version of endurantism, objects exist at times by participating in events that occur at those times. This version of transcendentism offers specific metaphysical and semantical advantages over other versions of endurantism. In this paper, we defend transcendentist endurantism against a series of criticisms that have been recently offered by Kristie Miller.

In this paper, I seek to examine Deleuze’s fascination with “spiritual automata” as a counterpoint to his more famous notion, the “body without organs”. I shall argue that both are grounded in a deep reflection, on Deleuze’s part, on the problems and issues generated by Spinoza’s notion of parallel attributes. Ultimately, I argue, the development of the two notions is motivated by identical metaphysical worries regarding the tenability of transformation, persistence, and affective interrelations between individuals. The answer, for both thinkers, (...) is the insertion of a “third” relational term, which virtually interfaces with each without violation of their parallel development. For Spinoza, such term is the absolutely infinite substance; for Deleuze, it is instead the notion of sense and the faculty of sense-making. (shrink)

Pylyshyn restricts cognitively penetrable vision to late vision, whereas he does not make any distinction between different kinds of penetrating cognition. I argue that this approach disconnects early vision content from late vision content and blurs the distinction between the latter and the content of thought. To overcome this problem I suggest that we should not distinguish between different kinds of visual content but instead introduce a restriction on the kind of cognition that can directly penetrate visual experience. In particular, (...) I suggest that visual experience, unlike thought, is directly penetrated only by practical non-propositional knowledge. I specify this weak cognitive penetrability in anti-representational terms. In particular, I suggest that the dependence of visual content on practical non-propositional knowledge should be conceived as a rational non-inferential relation, for it is in this way that we can account for the distinctive content of visual experience. (shrink)

In this paper we examine whether the sense of agency represents an obstacle to the project of naturalizing the mental. On the basis of a thought experiment we suggest that the sense of agency is not an epiphenomenon. We also examine Frith's attempt to explain in functionalist terms the sense of agency through the comparator and metarepresentational mechanisms. Through a variety of arguments we try to show that explanation by recourse to these mechanisms is inadequate. We conclude by suggesting that (...) one possible reason for the failure of the functionalist approaches is that they begin from the assumption that thought is a form a of willed action. (shrink)

I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space, and have different temporal parts at different times.

I defend my paper “Aquinas, Geach, and Existence”[1]against objections from Luca Gili, who argued that, according to Aquinas, future contingents do not enjoy genuine existence but exist in God’s mind only.[1] Damiano Costa, “Aquinas, Geach, and existence”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 3.

Aquinas’ theory of being has received a growing amount of attention from contemporary scholars, both from a historic and a philosophical point of view. An important source of this attention is Geach’s seminal Form and Existence. In it, Geach argues that Aquinas subscribes to a tensed notion of existence and a theory of time according to which past and future entities do not exist in act. Subsequent commentators, such as Kenny in his Aquinas on Being, have agreed with Geach on (...) both points. In this paper, I argue that in several passages of his corpus, most notably those in which he is concerned with God’s knowledge of future contingents, Aquinas implicitly subscribes to a theory of being and time according to which: past and future entities are attributed existence in act, there is theoretical need for introducing a tenseless notion of existence. (shrink)

In the world of Philosophy for Children (P4C), the word “method” is found frequently in its literature and in its practitioner’s handbooks. This paper focuses on the idea of community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) as P4C’s methodological framework for educational purposes, and evaluates that framework and those purposes in light of the question, what does it mean to bring children and philosophy together, and what methodological framework, if any, is appropriate to that project? Our broader aim is to highlight a (...) problem with regards to the concept of method in P4C, and to question the consequences of that concept in the practice of philosophical dialogue with children. To better situate the concept of method within P4C (which, we think, will help to clarify some of the dialogues and debates within P4C as a philosophical field), we will identify two different historical understandings—represented by Rene Descartes and Hans Georg Gadamer—of the concept, and suggest new possibilities for understanding philosophical practice with children in light of their difference. (shrink)

Capítulo de livro publicado em "Uma introdução à filosofia do direito" Itamar Luís Gelain (Org.) .- Ijuí: Ed. Unijuí, 2015. - 368 p. - (Coleção direito, política e cidadania; 37). . ISBN 978-85-419-0 I 75-8.

Departing from basic concepts in abstract logics, this paper introduces two concepts: conjunctive and disjunctive limits. These notions are used to formalize levels of modal operators.

Pylyshyn restricts cognitively penetrable vision to late vision, whereas he does not make any distinction between different kinds of penetrating cognition. I argue that this approach disconnects early vision content from late vision content and blurs the distinction between the latter and the content of thought. To overcome this problem I suggest that we should not distinguish between different kinds of visual content but instead introduce a restriction on the kind of cognition that can directly penetrate visual experience. In particular, (...) I suggest that visual experience, unlike thought, is directly penetrated only by practical non-propositional knowledge. I specify this weak cognitive penetrability in anti-representational terms. In particular, I suggest that the dependence of visual content on practical non-propositional knowledge should be conceived as a rational non-inferential relation, for it is in this way that we can account for the distinctive content of visual experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the indirect realists’ recourse to mental representations does not allow them to account for the possibility of hallucination, nor for the presentational character of visual experience. To account for the presentational character, I suggest a kind of intentionalism that is based on the interdependency between the perceived object and the embodied perceiver. This approach provides a positive account to the effect that genuine perception and hallucination are different kinds of states. Finally, I offer a (...) tentative suggestion as to how a hallucinatory experience may still be mistaken for a genuine perceptual experience. (shrink)

Esta nota mostra como reduzir o quadrado bidimensional de oposições ao segmento de oposições (uma dimensão) e ao ponto de oposições (objeto sem dimensão).

In this short article, I analyze forms of public speech by individuals in positions of power through a framework based on Austin’s theory of speech acts. I argue that because of the illocutionary and perlocutionary force attached to such individuals’ offices and their public figures, their public speech qualifies for being framed as speech acts—which are not covered by even a broad understanding of freedom of speech or right to privacy. Therefore, I formulate a call for the assessment of public (...) speech by individuals in positions of power through a framework based on “linguistic responsibility.” This framework accounts for the peculiar power structure that such individuals can and do exploit to bring about considerable real-world effects through what could be understood as an exploitation of their speech act power. (shrink)

According to McDowell’s transcendental empiricism, the world view depends on experience, which in turn depends on the world view. This seems to be in accord with the thesis that experience is theory-laden, but it also seems to introduce a problem of vicious circularity. I argue that McDowell’s account has the resources to avoid the problem of vicious circularity by exploiting the idea of a wider circle that involves more relata and more kinds of rational dependence. But the acceptance of this (...) idea entails that experience, though concept-laden, is not theory-laden. (shrink)

No interior das discussões contemporâneas em astropolítica, há um pequeno grupo de defensores da chamada exopolítica. Este texto - sobre assuntos ontológicos em filosofia da astropolítica - avalia fundamentos conceituais em dois encaminhamentos vigentes em teorias exopolíticas. Para isso, leva-se em conta um ambiente mais abrangente fornecido por aspectos relacionados às investigações em astrobiologia teórica.

Relativity theory is often said to support something called ‘the four-dimensional view of reality’. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is ‘spacetime unitism’, according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things as points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different sorts: thus space and time are not separate manifolds. A second is the B-theory of time, according to which the (...) past, present, and future are all equally real and there is nothing metaphysically special about the present. A third is perdurantism, according to which persisting material objects are made up of different temporal parts located at different times. We sketch routes from relativity to unitism and to the B-theory. We then discuss some routes to perdurantism, via the B-theory and via unitism. (shrink)

How to be being to be being/ next to the united and firm/ and trembling/ mouth of the poem?”, “How to say what is clearer than clarity [...]?” or “How to unite a light design and an obscure gesture?” These questions, as well as many others that emerge from the poetic and essay writing of António Ramos Rosa (1924-2013), represent different modulations of the same angular question: that of the relation between poem and reality, or, more radically, between poem and (...) being. And if such a question spreads into so many formulations it is because, in António Ramos Rosa, its scope is total, simultaneously aesthetic and ontological, metaphysical and spiritual. It is, therefore, this question that we will try to answer by looking into one of its possible faces: how can poetic creation be at the same time the most intimate gesture and the one that touches most deeply the undomesticated matter of the real, that absolute and unapprehensible Other? (shrink)

Nossa pesquisa é pautada na tentativa de compreender alguns conceitos da filosofia aristotélica, mais especificamente as noções de forma, matéria, privação e potência, e um pouco sobre a metodologia usada pelo filósofo. As linhas abaixo compõem um capítulo da minha monografia de fim de curso, intitulada Dialogo com a tradição: A conquista de novas convicções acerca dos princípios de natureza no primeiro livro da Física aristotélica, realizada na Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro. Nela tratei a respeito da metodologia (...) de Aristóteles que, dentre outras coisas, passa pela crítica à filosofia precedente, esclarecendo assim algumas questões do primeiro livro da Física – livro no qual o filósofo tenta determinar quantos e quais são os princípios da natureza. (shrink)

Esta coletânea reúne, organizados na forma de capítulos, sete artigos que exploraram uma ideia central: a de que, subjacente à Lógica de Hegel, há uma mathesis, isto é, uma estruturação matemática que organiza as ideias dessa Lógica, mathesis de que Hegel faz uso, de modo implícito, ao longo do texto da "Ciência da Lógica".

A partir de la tesis del filósofo español Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936), según la cual el extremo occidental — Portugal — y el extremo oriental — India — se dieron las manos espirituales por vía de la comprensión de la vanidad del mundo (vanitas), presentada en su obra Por tierras de Portugal y España (1911), nos proponemos poner en diálogo las visiones del mundo barroco occidental y del mundo budista oriental sobre la vanidad y la muerte. En este sentido, nuestra (...) reflexión se centrará en el pensamiento del P. António Vieira, como ejemplo capital del pensamiento barroco portugués, y en el Sermón de Benares, como texto fundador del budismo. (shrink)

Resumo: Este trabalho é centrado em mostrar parte da propagação da Metafísica Contemporânea feita por Peter van Inwagen. Demonstraremos alguns argumentos do autor e suas respectivas análises sobre a validação do argumento dualista, dentre eles a comparação entre dois importantes e diferentes dualismos, especialmente o de Descartes e Leibniz. Van Inwagen aponta problemas nos dois argumentos. Por fim esclarece-nos muito sobre o problema da representação de fenómenos mentais versus representações físicas, o que explica um importante aspecto que contribui para o (...) surgimento do problema mente-corpo. -/- Abstract: This paper shows part of Peter van Inwagen’s propagation of contemporary metaphysics. We will demonstrate some of the author’s arguments and his respective analyses on validating the dualist argument, among them the comparison between two important and different dualisms, especially Descartes’ and Leibniz's. We will see that van Inwagen’s review points out problems in both arguments. Van Inwagen's review points out problems in both arguments. Finally, it sheds much light on the problem of the representation of mental phenomena versus physical representations, which explains an important aspect that contributes to the emergence of the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Este artigo mostra que combinando as noções lógicas de 'contingência' e 'conhecimento' nós podemos formular uma tese cética de acordo com a qual 'o mundo não pode ser conhecido'. Além disso, ele mostra que tal tese é plausível do ponto de vista epistemológico.

De modo geral, este texto é uma incursão em lógica filosófica e filosofia da lógica. Ele contém reflexões originais acerca dos conceitos de paraconsistência, modalidades e cognoscibilidade e suas possíveis relações. De modo específico, o texto avança em quatro direções principais: inicialmente, uma definição genérica de lógicas não clássicas utilizando a ideia de lógica abstrata é sugerida. Em seguida, é mostrado como técnicas manuais de paraconsistentização de lógicas são usadas para gerar sistemas particulares de lógicas paraconsistentes. Depois, uma definição de (...) possibilidade lógica é proposta por meio da ideia de limites de sequências de fórmulas. Por fim, muitas abordagens distintas ao paradoxo de Fitch e, consequentemente, aos limites do conhecimento são apresentadas considerando as reflexões anteriores. (shrink)